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Who Owes How Much?
Developments in Apportionment
and Joint and Several Liability
Under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
by Thomas A. Eaton*
I. INTRODUCTION
For most of its history, Georgia followed the traditional common law
rule of joint and several liability and the equally well-settled principle
that negligence could not be compared with intent when apportioning
liability. Both of those propositions were dramatically altered by the
enactment of the 2005 amendments to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 51-12-331 as construed by the Georgia
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of
Texas (BA., 1972); University of Texas Law School (J.D., 1975). I would like to thank
Mike Wells for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. O.C.GA § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
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Supreme Court in two recent opinions. In McReynolds v. Krebs,2 the
court held that pursuant toO.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b): (1) damages must be
apportioned among persons who are liable according to percentages of
fault of each person even if the plaintiff is not herself at fault; and (2)
such apportioned damages are not subject to the rule of joint and several
liability.3 In Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.,' the court held that under
the same statute fault could be apportioned among negligent and
intentional tortfeasors.5 The combination of these two rulings will have
a considerable impact on tort litigation in Georgia. Defendants,
particularly those in negligent security premises liability cases, will see
their liability exposure significantly reduced. They will now be
responsible only for the percentage of damages corresponding to their
own percentage of fault.6 Innocent plaintiffs will now bear the burden
of the "uncollectible share"7 of damages, thereby reducing the prospect
of securing a full recovery.' Moreover, the successful plaintiff will have
to collect separately from each individual defendant, thereby increasing
the transaction costs of securing recovery.9
This Article is divided into three sections. The first section discusses
apportionment, Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., and related cases. The
focus of this discussion is on to whom fault may or may not be appor-
tioned. The second section discusses joint and several liability,
McReynolds v. Krebs, and related cases. The focus of this discussion is
on from whom can a successful plaintiff collect a damage award. The
third section of this Article briefly discusses what lies ahead in light of
these recent developments.
2. 290 Ga. 850, 725 S.E.2d 584 (2012).
3. Id. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587.
4. 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012). In the interest of full disclosure, my colleague,
Mike Wells, and I co-authored an amicus brief on behalf of ourselves in Couch in which we
argued that O.C.GA. § 51-12-33 should not be construed to permit apportionment of fault
between negligent defendants and unidentified criminals. BriefofAmici Curiae of Thomas
A. Eaton and Michael L. Wells, Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378
(2012). Our arguments did not prevail.
5. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 382.
6. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
7. By the term "uncollectible share," I refer to the percentage of damages apportioned
to parties or non-parties from whom the plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to collect. An
uncollectible share may be apportioned to an unknown and unidentifiable person, or to a
person or entity who is immune from liability, or to a person or entity who has no
insurance or other assets from which to satisfy a legal judgment.
8. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c)-(f).
9. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a).
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II. APPORTIONMENT:
To WHOM MAY FAULT BE APPORTIONED?
A. Intentional Tortfeasors: Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.
In order to understand the significance of Couch v. Red Roof Inns,
Inc., 1" a little background is needed. Prior to Couch, Georgia courts
held that comparative negligence is not a defense to an intentional
tort." The primary justification for this rule is the notion that intent
is "a separate and distinct" type of conduct from negligence. 2 The vast
majority of states take the same position: comparative fault is not a
defense to an intentional tort. 3 Thus, the long-standing rule in
Georgia and elsewhere has been that intent and negligence are not
comparable.
10. 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
11. E.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Newman, 94 Ga. 560, 21 S.E. 219 (1894);
Flanagan v. Riverside Military Acad., 218 Ga. App. 123, 126, 460 S.E.2d 824 (1995).
Accord Gates v. Navy, 274 Ga. App. 180, 183, 617 S.E.2d 163, 167 (2005) ("It [has been]
well-settled that the defenses of comparative negligence, negligence per se, assumption of
the risk and contributory negligence are not valid defenses to intentional, wilful, or wanton
and reckless torts ....") (quoting Hopkins v. First Union Bank, 193 Ga. App. 109, 111, 387
S.E.2d 144, 146 (1989)); McEachern v. Moldovon, 234 Ga. App. 152, 505 S.E.2d 495 (1998).
12. McEachern, 234 Ga. App. at 157, 505 S.E.2d at 501.
13. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Young, 670 P.2d 1324, 1326 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (finding
apportionment does not apply to intentional torts); Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc.,
Ltd, 650 So. 2d 712, 719-20 (La. 1995) (noting that fundamental differences between
negligence and intent preclude comparison of fault); Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co., 127 P.3d
572 (Okla. 2005) (same); Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762,776 (Or. Ct.
App. 2005) (attempting to compare negligence with intent is "conceptually incoherent")
(quoting Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 974 P.2d 738, 748 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tenn. 1997)
(dicussing negligent and intentional torts are "different in degree, in kind, and in society's
view" and thus should not be compared); Welch v. Southland Corp., 952 P.2d 162 (Wash.
1998) (same). See generally VICTOR E. ScHwARTz, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5:02, at
121-22 (5th ed. 2010) ("At common law, contributory negligence was not a defense to
liability when the defendant's conduct could be characterized as an intentional wrong.
Under comparative negligence, the result is likely to be the same .... ."); HENRY WOODS
& BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 7:1, at 151 (3d ed. 1996) ("The great majority of
cases hold that comparative negligence is not applicable to intentional torts.").
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In 2005, the Georgia legislature enacted a comprehensive tort reform
package. Amendments to O.C.G.A. § 51-.12-3314 were a part of that
package. Subsection (b) § of 51-12-33 provides that:
the trier of fact. . . shall ... apportion its award of damages among
the persons who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each
person. Damages apportioned by the trier of fact as provided in this
14. O.C.GA. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
(a) Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person
or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or
damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of
damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the
plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to
the plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.
(b) Where an action is brought against more than one person for injury to person
or property, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages
to be awarded, if any, shall after a reduction of damages pursuant to subsection
(a) of this Code section, if any, apportion its award of damages among the persons
who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person. Damages
apportioned by the trier of fact as provided in this Code section shall be the
liability of each person against whom they are awarded, shall not be a joint
liability among the persons liable, and shall not be subject to any right of
contribution.
(c) In assessing percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider the fault of all
persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages, regardless
of whether the person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party to the
suit.
(d)(1) Negligence or fault of a nonparty shall be considered if the plaintiff entered
into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or ifa defending party gives notice
not later than 120 days prior to the date of trial that a nonparty was wholly or
partially at fault.
(2) The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action designating the
nonparty and setting forth the nonparty's name and last known address, or the
best identification of the nonparty which is possible under the circumstances,
together with a brief statement of the basis for believing the nonparty to be at
fault.
(e) Nothing in this Code section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or
immunities which currently exist, except as expressly stated in this Code section.
(f)(1) Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used only in the
determination of the percentage of fault of named parties.
(2) Where fault is assessed against nonparties pursuant to this Code section,
findings of fault shall not subject any nonparty to liability in any action or be
introduced as evidence of liability in any action.
(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Code section or any other provisions
of law which might be construed to the contrary, the plaintiff shall not be entitled
to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the
injury or damages claimed.
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Code section shall be the liability of each person against whom they are
awarded, [and] shall not Je a joint liability ... 15
The term "fault" is not defined in the statute. The issue presented to the
Georgia Supreme Court in Couch was whether the undefined term fault
contained in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 altered the common law definition to
now permit apportionment among negligent and unidentified intentional
tortfeasors. 16
The complaint in Couch alleged that the plaintiff was a registered
guest of a Red Roof Inn hotel in Atlanta which was owned by one
defendant and managed by another defendant. The complaint further
alleged that while on those premises, the plaintiff was abducted, beaten,
and robbed by several individuals. None of the assailants were ever
identified, arrested, or prosecuted. The plaintiff filed a premises liability
suit against the defendants in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, alleging that they failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect the plaintiff, an invitee, from the foreseeable
risk of a criminal assault. The defendants filed a pleading in which they
gave notice of their intent to have fault apportioned to the unknown
criminal assailants.'7 The plaintiff responded by challenging the
applicability and constitutionality of the apportionment statute. The
federal district court did not rule on this motion. 18 Instead, it certified
the following two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court:
(1) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a
defendant property owner -negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable
criminal attack, is the jury allowed to consider the "fault" of the
criminal assailant and apportion its award of damages among the
property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to [O.C.G.A.] § 51-
12-33?
(2) In a premises liability case in which the jury determines a
defendant property owner negligently failed to prevent a foreseeable
criminal attack, would jury instructions or a special verdict form
requiring the jury to apportion its award of damages among the
property owner and the criminal assailant, pursuant to [O.C.G.A.] § 51-
15. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
16. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
17. See PlaintiffVAppellant's Brief Regarding Certified Questions, Couch v. Red Roof
Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) (No. S12Q0625), 2012 WL 377254, at *2.
Under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1), a defendant who seeks to have fault apportioned to a
nonparty must give notice not later than 120 days prior to the date of trial. O.C.G. § 51-
12-33(dXl).
18. Plaintiff/Appelant's Brief, supra note 17, at *2.
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12-33, result in a violation of the plaintiff[ls constitutional rights to a
jury trial, due process or ,equal protection?"9
Thus, the court was called upon to resolve both a question of statutory
construction and a question of constitutional law. The court held that
"(1) the jury is allowed to apportion damages among the property owner
and the criminal assailant and (2) instructions or a special verdict form
requiring such apportionment would not violate the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights." °
The key to the majority's ruling on the statutory construction issue
was that it viewed intentional wrongdoing as falling within the
"ordinary meaning" of the statutory term "fault."2 As stated by the
court, "the ordinary meaning of 'fault' ... includes intentional con-
duct."22  The court further observed that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)(1)
refers to "[niegligence or fault," indicating that the term "fault" must
necessarily encompass more than simple negligence.2 3 The court also
noted that had the legislature intended to exclude "intent" from the
ambit of fault, it could have done so explicitly.
By characterizing the ordinary meaning of fault to include intent, the
court was able to dismiss other concerns. As interpreted by the majority,
the ordinary meaning rendered it unnecessary to consider that other
states authorizing apportionment among negligent and intentional
tortfeasors do so under statutes that expressly define fault to include
intent.2 The ordinary meaning construction also rendered inapplicable
the canon regarding strict construction of statutes in derogation of
common law.
26
The majority dismissed the constitutional challenges in a single
paragraph. The plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial is not
violated because the jury still performs its "normal function-it assesses
liability, calculates damages, and names the tortfeasors who are
responsible."2 7 Plaintiffs are not denied due process because the
statute is not unconstitutionally vague and it does not destroy a vested
property right.28 Finally, the apportionment statute does not violate
19. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
20. Id. Justice Melton authored the majority opinion in which four justices joined. Id.
Justices Benham and Hunstein dissented. Id. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
21. Id. at 361, 729 S.E.2d at 380-81.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 362, 729 S.E.2d at 381.
24. Id. at 362-63, 729 S.E.2d at 381.
25. Id. at 363, 729 S.E.2d at 382.
26. Id. at 364, 729 S.E.2d at 383.
27. Id. at 367, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
28. Id.
[Vol. 64
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the principle of equal protection because it is supported by a rational
basis.'
The majority's analysis of the statutory construction issue is facile at
best. The ultimate test of what a statute means is not how the Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word "fault," but it is the
legislative intent. Justice Benham properly noted that "there is more to
statutory construction when Georgia's common law is at issue than
looking through the dictionary of one's choice . . . .,0 Given the
historical refusal of Georgia and other common law courts to compare
intent with negligence, the absence of a statutory definition of fault,3'
and the fact that the Georgia comparative negligence statute32 was not
amended when the apportionment provisions were enacted, it is not so
clear that the legislature intended to permit apportionment among
negligent and intentional wrongdoers.
One consequence of Couch is to create a de facto comparative fault
defense to an intentional tort when the plaintiff is partially at fault-an
outcome never before permitted under Georgia law. A simple example
will illustrate this point. Assume a plaintiff is attacked in the parking
lot of a bar and brings suit against the owner of the premises for
negligent security. Assume further that the premises owner alleges that
the plaintiff was negligent 33 and seeks to apportion fault to the
criminal assailant. Finally, assume that a jury apportions five percent
of the fault to the plaintiff, twenty percent to the premises owner, and
29. Id.
30. Id. at 367, 729 S.E.2d at 384-85 (Benham, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 368-69, 729 S.E.2d at 385. The majority correctly notes that Colorado courts
permit apportionment among negligent and intentional tortfeasors under a statute that
refers to "negligence or fault" without a specific definition of fault. Id. at 362 n.6, 729
S.E.2d at 381 n.6 (majority opinion). It does not acknowledge that a greater number of
states that apportion fault among intentional and negligent tertfeasors do so under
statutes that explicitly include "intent." E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-45 (current through
2012 Legis. Sess.), available at www.in.govfiegislative/ic/code/title34/ar6/ch2.html (stating
fault includes conduct that is "intentional"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (current
through 2012 Legis. Sess.); available at httpJ/egislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-600-6304
(fault includes intentional conduct); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.900 (current through 2011-
2012 Legis. Sess.) available at www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/folio.asp (stating fault includes
conduct that is intentional).
32. See O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 (2000). O.C.G.A. § 51-11-7 does not use the term fault.
Instead, it refers to "ordinary care" and "consequences ... caused by the defendant's
negligence." Id.
33. The defendants in Couch raised the defense of comparative negligence against the
plaintiff and thus sought to have fault apportioned among the plaintiff, the defendants, and
several unknown and unidentified intentional tortfeasors. Plaintiff/Appelant's Brief, supra
note 17, at *2.
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seventy-five percent to the criminal assailant. 4  Applying O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33(b) as construed, in Couch to these facts, the criminal
assailant's liability to the plaintiff would be reduced by five percent
notwithstanding the fact that the comparative negligence statute on its
face does not appear to apply in the context of intentional torts.35
The majority's treatment of the constitutional issues is even more
troubling, not so much for its conclusions as for its lack of depth or
explanation. 6 The court in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, RC. v.
Nestlehutt 7 held that the legislative cap on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice cases violated the jury trial provision of the Georgia
constitution." The cap on recovery for non-economic damages was part
of the same tort reform legislation that produced the apportionment
provision of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. Given such a recent invocation of the
right to a jury trial to invalidate one provision of the 2005 tort reform
package, one could reasonably expect at least a modest explanation of
why apportionment among intentional and negligent tortfeasors is
constitutional, but the cap on non-economic damages is not.
Some of the constitutional challenges were not addressed at all in the
court's opinion. A plausible argument exists that apportioning fault to
unknown tortfeasors violates the plaintiff's right to due process. 39 The
primary vice is the prospect of irreconcilable conflicting determinations
of fault. Assume, for example, that the first jury apportions twenty
percent of the fault to the known defendant and eighty percent to an
34. This illustration is based on the facts of an actual case in which the jury made this
precise apportionment of fault. See Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14
(1991).
35. The court in Couch, of course, only addressed apportionment in the context of an
allegedly negligent plaintiff, allegedly negligent defendants, and unidentified allegedly
intentional tortfeasors. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379. It will be interesting
to see if comparisons of negligence and intent are authorized only in this setting or if
comparative negligence will now be a recognized defense to an intentional tort when there
is not an additional negligent defendant. It would be bizarre to permit intentional
tortfeasors to reduce their liability when there are also negligent tortfeasors, but not allow
apportionment when there are not negligent tortfeasors.
36. It is difficult to assess the correctness of the substantive conclusions given such a
cursory development of the reasoning.
37. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
38. Id. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
39. Other states have held that apportioning fault to unknown parties violates the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. E.g., Newville v. Dep't of Family Servs., 883 P.2d 793
(Mont. 1994) (finding it is a violation of procedural due process); Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 927 P.2d 1011 (Mont. 1996) (finding it is a violation of substantive due process); see
also Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 135 (Ark. 2009) (finding it is a
violation of separation of powers).
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unknown person." The percentage of fault apportioned to the un-
known person is not binding on that individual,4 but it is binding on
the plaintiff. If the person who was unknown at the time of the first
trial is later identified and sued in a separate second trial, the now-
known defendant would be free to argue that the first defendant was
actually more responsible for the harm. The first defendant would have
no economic incentive to participate in the second trial because the
extent of his liability has already been determined. The jury in the
second trial could apportion twenty percent of the fault to the now-
known defendant and eighty percent to the original defendant. Despite
the fact that both juries found the plaintiff to be completely innocent, the
conflicting allocations of fault would leave the plaintiff with the potential
of recovering only forty percent of her damages. Surely such an outcome
would offend traditional notions of fairness that underlie the constitu-
tional right of due process. Given its cursory treatment of the constitu-
tional issues, perhaps the court will deem it appropriate to address them
more fully should they be presented in an appropriate future case.
The above criticisms notwithstanding, it is clear that for the first time
in the state's history, the trier of fact will be asked to assign percentages
of fault to negligent and intentional tortfeasors.
B. Parties with Immunities: Barnett v. Farmer
The case of Barnett v. Farmer42 involved a simple automobile
accident. The driver of one vehicle and his wife sued the driver of the
other vehicle. The defendant sought an instruction to the effect that
insofar as the wife and passenger's claim is concerned, the jury could
apportion fault to her husband. The Georgia Court of Appeals held
that such an instruction should be given notwithstanding the doctrine
of interspousal immunity." The "clear intent of the legislature" was
that the negligent driver of one vehicle should not have to bear the
damages allocable to the plaintiff's husband's negligence.45
40. Under O.C.GA. § 51-12-33(c) the "trier of fact shall consider the fault of all persons
or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or damages, regardless of whether the
person or entity was, or could have been, named as a party to the suit." O.C.GA. § 51-12-
33(c) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this provision, the court held in Couch that fault could
be apportioned to the unidentified assailants. See Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at
379.
41. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(02).
42. 308 Ga. App. 358, 707 S.E.2d 570 (2011).
43. Id. at 358, 707 S.E.2d at 571.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 362, 707 S.E.2d at 574.
2012]
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Apportioning fault to the passenger's husband did not violate the
interspousal immunity doctrine because it merely limits the non-immune
defendant's liability.46 It "in no way requires" the plaintiff to bring suit
against her husband or impose any liability upon him.47
This ruling appears to be consistent with the statutory language that
fault be apportioned among all persons who contributed to the alleged
injury, "regardless of whether the person or entity was, or could have
been, named as a party to the suit."' 8 The reasoning here would seem
to apply to allegedly negligent governments, government officials,
charities, employers, or others who may enjoy an immunity. Indeed, an
"entity" that could not be named a party in the suit would appear to
contemplate all the various forms of governmental and charitable
immunities.
C. No Duty = No Fault = No Apportionment: Union Carbide Corp. v.
Fields
The case of Union Carbide Corp. v. Fields49 involved a suit brought
against a number of defendants for alleged asbestos-related injuries.
Each defendant affirmatively pled what the court referred to as "the
defense of nonparty fault" seeking to have fault apportioned to a number
of non-parties.5 ° One of these non-parties was the Georgia Power
Company. Georgia Power had been the employer of the father of one of
the plaintiffs. The defendants argued that fault should be apportioned
to Georgia Power because it was culpably responsible for the asbestos
dust left on the plaintiff's father's work clothes, to which the plaintiff
was exposed at home, which contributed to her injuries.5' The court of
appeals rejected this argument, holding that since Georgia Power did not
owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, 2 it could not be deemed to be at
fault for purposes of apportionment.53 The court noted, "[i]n the
absence of a legally cognizable duty, there can be no fault or negli-
gence."54
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(c).
49. 315 Ga. App. 554, 726 S.E.2d 521 (2012).
50. Id. at 556, 726 S.E.2d at 524.
51. Id. at 557, 726 S.E.2d at 525.
52. The proposition that an employer owes no duty of care to a third party who comes
in contact with asbestos-tainted work clothing was established in CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Williams, 278 Ga. 888, 891, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2005).
53. Fields, 315 Ga. App. at 559, 726 S.E.2d at 526.
54. Id. at 558, 726 S.E.2d at 525 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Reese, 300 Ga. App. 82,
84, 684 S.E.2d 279, 283 (2009)). The court also affirmed the granting of the plaintiffs
[Vol. 64
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The court distinguished immunity from no duty.55 When the non-
party is immune, as was the case in Barnett, the finder of fact may
consider evidence of the non-party's conduct and apportion fault. When
the non-party owes no duty to the plaintiff, the non-party's conduct
cannot be considered at fault for purposes of the apportionment
statute.
56
D. Derivative Liability is Not Subject to Apportionment: PN Express,
Inc. v. Zegel
PN Express, Inc. v. Zegel57 involved a collision between a tractor-
trailer and an automobile. The driver of the automobile was severely
injured and brought suit against PN Express. The plaintiff contended
that PN Express was a common carrier commercial lessee of the tractor-
trailer which would make PN Express the statutory employer of the
negligent driver. In the alternative, the plaintiff maintained that PN
Express was the actual employer of the negligent driver and could be
held liable under traditional principles of respondeat superior.58 The
court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence in the record to
support both theories.59 PN Express further argued that the trial court
erred in failing to instruct the jury to apportion fault.6° The court of
appeals held that it was not error to give the requested charge to the
jury because apportionment of damages is not permitted when liability
is entirely derivative.6 '
motion for partial summary judgement regarding fifty-one other non-parties designated by
the defendant. Id. at 556-64, 726 S.E.2d at 524-29. Fault could not be apportioned to
these entities because the "[diefendants had failed to produce any evidence creating a jury
question whether these nonparties were responsible for any asbestos-containing products
to which Mrs. Fields was exposed." Id. at 556, 726 S.E.2d at 524. For this aspect of Fields,
see text accompanying infra notes 92-107.
55. Id. at 557-58, 726 S.E.2d at 525.
56. Id.
57. 304 Ga. App. 672, 697 S.E.2d 226 (2010).
58. See id. at 672, 697 S.E.2d at 228.
59. Id. at 677, 697 S.E.2d at 231.
60. Id. at 679-80, 697 S.E.2d at 233.
61. Id. at 680, 697 S.E.2d at 233. The court of appeals's opinion is confusing on one
point. When discussing the apportionment issue, the court refers to an allegation that a
broker, Patterson Freight Systems, negligently supervised the driver. Id. The plaintiffs
complaint did contain such an allegation. The plaintiff dropped that claim, however, and
neither the plaintiff nor PN Express presented any evidence that Patterson Freight
Systems was in fact negligent. Thus, the refusal to submit an apportionment instruction
as to Patterson is better explained in terms of a deficiency of evidence. See text
accompanying supra note 52, and infra note 92.
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This holding makes a great deal of sense. When an employer is held
vicariously liable under the doctrines of statutory employer or responde-
at superior, the only fault is that of the employee. There is no fault on
the part of the employer to be apportioned. In such situations, the jury
can determine the fault of the employee for which, as a matter of law,
the employer is responsible.
III. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:
How MUCH DOES EACH PERSON OWE?
Apportionment concerns to whom may fault be allocated. Joint and
several liability concerns how much each person owes. Joint liability
means that if there are two or more tortfeasors whose wrongful conduct
caused a single indivisible injury to the plaintiff, each tortfeasor is
responsible for the entire harm.62 Thus, the successful plaintiff could
enforce the entire judgement against any one defendant. The defendant
who paid the judgement could seek contribution from the other
defendants," but that defendant would have no recourse should the
other defendants lack the resources to pay. Thus, the practical impact
of joint liability is to place the risk of tortfeasor insolvency on the other
tortfeasors.
For most of the state's history, Georgia followed the common law rule
of joint and several liability.4 If two or more persons were liable for
the plaintiff's injury, she could recover the entire amount of her damages
from any of them and the defendant who paid the judgement could seek
contribution from the other defendants.65
This structure was modified in 1987 with the enactment of O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33. 66 That statute abrogated the application of joint liability
in actions where "the plaintiff is to some degree responsible" for her own
injuries." In such cases, each defendant was legally obligated to pay
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
63. Contribution is the right of a tortfeasor who pays more than his appropriate share
of a joint liability to secure payments from the other joint tortfeasors. See generally DAN
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 386 & 387 (West 2000). Contribution is authorized in
Georgia by O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
64. For a concise history of Georgia law on this point see Emily Ruth Boness, Note, The
Effect (Or Noneffect) of the 2005 Amendments to 0. C.GA. Sections 51-12-31 and 51-12-33
on Joint Liability in Georgia, 44 GA. L. REv. 215, 224-27 (2009).
65. Id. at 226.
66. Id. at 227.
67. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a). O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a), as enacted in 1987, provided that
in actions where the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury, any damages
apportioned by the trier of fact "shall not be a joint liability... and shall not be subject
to any right of contribution." O.C.GA. § 51-12-33(a) (2000 & Supp. 2012).
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no more than their percentage share of the plaintiff's damages.68 The
innocent plaintiff, however could still avail herself of the rule of joint
and several liability. The post-1987 rule in Georgia placed the risk of
tortfeasor insolvency on co-defendants when the plaintiff was innocent
and wholly on the plaintiff when she was also at fault.69
In 2005, the legislature extensively amended O.G.G.A. § 51-12-33.
Subsection (b) states that when'damages are apportioned "among the
persons who are liable.., the liability of each person against whom they
are awarded, shall not be a joint liability among the persons liable, and
shall not be subject to any right of contribution." 0 This language
clearly indicates that liability under subsection (b) is not joint. The big
question that emerged following the enactment of the 2005 amendment
was whether subsection (b) applies only to cases in which the plaintiff
is at fault or whether it abolishes joint liability even when the plaintiff
is innocent.
The argument that the 2005 amendments did not abolish joint liability
when the plaintiff was not at fault goes as follows: (1) subsection (b)
states that apportionment of damages should be done "after a reduction
of damages pursuant to subsection (a)";71 and (2) subsection (a) deals
with cases where "the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the
injury or damages claimed."2 Thus, the argument goes, a fair reading
of the statute is that subsection (b) was intended to provide in detail
how to apportion fault in cases where the plaintiff was at fault. An
additional point pertains to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32. This statute authorizes
contribution and was not repealed with the passage of the 2005
amendments."3 Contribution is available only in cases of joint liabili-
ty.74 If the 2005 amendments to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 abolished joint
liability generally, the contribution statute would be superfluous. By not
repealing O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32, the legislature indicated that there must
still be situations in which contribution applies. The most logical way
to harmonize the two statutes would be to limit the apportionment
provision and the corresponding abrogation ofjoint liability contained in
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) to cases in which the plaintiff is at fault.
68. See, e.g., Turner v. New Horizons Cmty. Serv. Bd., 287 Ga. App. 329, 651 S.E.2d
473 (2007).
69. Q.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
70. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
71. Id.
72. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a).
73. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-32(a).
74. O.C.GA. § 51-12-32(b).
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The counterargument is grounded in the "if any" language found in
§ 51-12-33(b). Subsection. (b) states that apportionment among
defendants should take place after a reduction has been made to account
for the plaintiff's fault, "if any."5 The phrase "if any" signifies that the
legislature envisioned cases in which the plaintiff was not at fault, but
the apportionment and corresponding abrogation of joint liability would
nonetheless apply.
The issue of the scope of subsection (b) was first addressed in Cavalier
Convenience, Inc. v. Sarvis.76 Sarvis was injured in an automobile
accident. He sued Jeremi Bath, the seventeen-year-old driver of the
other vehicle who was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident.
Sarvis also sued the convenience store that allegedly sold intoxicating
beverages to Bath. Sarvis filed a motion seeking a ruling from the trial
court precluding the apportionment of fault between Bath and the
convenience store. Sarvis argued that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) only
applied when the plaintiff was at fault. The trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.77 The
court of appeals held that the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b)
requires apportionment of fault among multiple wrongdoers even when
the plaintiff is not at fault.7" A necessary implication of this holding
is that when damages are apportioned according to percentages of fault,
the liability is not joint. Each party is responsible only for their share
of the damages. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
this case, but the petition was later withdrawn by the plaintiff.
A second case raising the same issues, McReynolds v. Krebs, 9 did
find its way to the Georgia Supreme Court. The facts and context in
which the apportionment/joint liability issues were raised are a bit
unusual.8 " The litigation grew out of an automobile accident in which
the plaintiff, Lisa Krebs, was injured. She sued the driver of the other
vehicle (McReynolds) and General Motors (GM), the manufacturer of the
automobile in which Krebs was a passenger. McReynolds cross-claimed
against GM for contribution and set off. Krebs settled with GM for an
undisclosed sum. After the settlement, the trial court dismissed
McReynold's cross-claims, reasoning that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 had
75. Id.
76. 305 Ga. App. 141, 699 S.E.2d 104 (2010).
77. Id. at 141-42, 699 S.E.2d at 105.
78. Id. at 145, 699 S.E.2d at 107.
79. 290 Ga. 850, 725 S.E.2d 584 (2012) ("McReynolds I").
80. What makes this case unusual is that it was the plaintiff-not a defendant-who
was arguing that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 abolished joint and several liability. McReynolds I,
290 Ga. at 850, 725 S.E.2d at 586.
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effectively abolished joint liability and replaced contribution and set off
with a process of apportionment among multiple tortfeasors. The case
went to trial and a jury awarded the plaintiff $1,246,000.42 in damag-
es."1 The trial court entered a judgment against McReynolds for the
full amount,"2 which was affirmed by the court of appeals."
In affirming the lower courts, the Georgia Supreme Court issued four
important rulings. First, it held that "in applying [O.C.G.A.] § 51-12-33,
the trier of fact must 'apportion its award of damages among the persons
who are liable according to the percentage of fault of each person' even
if the plaintiff is not at fault for the injury or damages claimed."' In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the "if any" phrase of
subsection (b) and concluded that the legislature intended subsection (b)
to apply even when the plaintiff was not at fault.8 5 The second holding
was that there was no error in dismissing the cross-claim for contribu-
tion." Subsection (b) of the statute expressly states that apportioned
damages "shall not be subject to any right of contribution" and "shall not
be a joint liability among the persons liable." 7 In light of this clear
language, there could be no claim for contribution. 8 In further support
of this ruling, the court invoked the well-settled principle that "contribu-
tion will not lie in the absence of joint or joint and several liability."'
The third major holding was that it was not error to dismiss the cross-
claim for set off because McReynolds presented no evidence to establish
that GM was at least partially liable for the plaintiff's injury." Fourth,
McReynolds was also not entitled to have her liability reduced by
apportioning fault to GM since she presented no evidence from which a
jury could find GM was liable to the plaintiff.9
The central lesson of McReynolds is that when fault is apportioned
pursuant to § 51-12-33(b), joint liability does not apply even when the
plaintiff is not at fault. The practical importance of this ruling is that
the risk of tortfeasor insolvency now lies squarely on the shoulders of the
plaintiff, even if innocent.
81. McReynolds v. Krebs, 307 Ga. App. 330, 330-32, 705 S.E.2d 214, 215-16 (2010)
("McReynolds I1").
82. Id. at 332, 705 S.E.2d at 216.
83. Id. at 337, 705 S.E.2d at 219.
84. McReynolds I, 290 Ga. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
85. McReynolds 1, 290 Ga. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587.
86. Id.
87. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
88. McReynolds 1, 290 Ga. at 852, 725 S.E.2d at 587.
89. Id. (quoting Weller v. Brown, 266 Ga. 130, 130, 464 S.E.2d 805, 806 (1996)).
90. Id. at 853, 725 S.E.2d at 588.
91. Id.
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A second, and perhaps less obvious, lesson is that apportionment
under subsection (b) is not self-executing. A defendant seeking to have
fault apportioned to others must do more than simply file notice or bring
them into the lawsuit. The burden lies on the person seeking apportion-
ment to prove that the party or non-party upon whom it seeks to
apportion fault is liable to the plaintiff." In other words, the party
seeking apportionment must prove the same elements as the plaintiff
would have to prove if she were suing directly. As the facts of McRey-
nolds illustrate, that burden may sometimes be expensive and difficult.
The plaintiffs claim against GM was essentially one sounding in
products liability for an allegedly defective design. In such cases, expert
witnesses are often needed to testify regarding the risks and utility of
the design, the availability of a reasonable alternative design, and issues
of causation.9" Thus, to meet her burden of proving that GM was at
least partially liable to the plaintiff, McReynolds would have to bear the
expense of mounting a successful products liability case against GM.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS:
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
A. Implications
McReynolds creates a strong incentive for defendants to bring in as
many parties and non-parties as feasible among whom fault can be
apportioned. The abrogation of joint liability means that every
percentage of fault allocated to someone else reduces the liability of a
defendant. Thus, McReynolds will serve to reduce a defendant's liability
exposure. A defendant's ability to avail itself of this strategy is limited
by its ability to prove that the co-defendants and non-parties are at least
partially liable to the plaintiff. As illustrated in McReynolds and Fields,
this may not always be easy.94
From the plaintiff's perspective, McReynolds reduces the chances of
securing a full recovery. The elimination of joint liability when fault is
apportioned to parties and non-parties effectively places the risk of the
92. This holding reinforces the court of appeals's ruling in Union Carbide Corp. v.
Fields that the defendant could not have fault apportioned to fifty-one non-parties when
the defendant failed to present evidence from which a jury could find that these non-parties
were liable to the plaintiff. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fields, 315 Ga. App. 554, 556, 726
S.E.2d 521, 524 (2012).
93. "Products liability actions today almost always require the testimony of expert
witnesses to prove concepts of science, engineering, industrial design, and other technical
fields .... Expert testimony may be necessary to establish a defect in the product or
causation." J. KENNARD NEAL, GEORGIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12:8, at 265 (4th ed. 2012).
94. See text accompanying supra note 54, and supra note 90.
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uncollectible share to the innocent plaintiff. The innocent plaintiff will
not be able to secure compensation for the percentage of damages
corresponding to the fault apportioned to unknown non-parties, those
protected by immunities, or those who are uninsured or otherwise lack
assets from which a judgment can be paid.
The risk of the uncollectible share will be a particularly difficult
problem for plaintiffs in premises liability cases involving negligent
security. In Couch, the Georgia Supreme Court held that fault can be
apportioned among the negligent premises owner and unidentified
criminal assailants.95 Every percentage of fault apportioned to the
unidentified criminals is a percentage of damages for which even an
innocent plaintiff will not likely receive compensation. As other courts
have observed, it is reasonable to expect that as between a negligent
premises owner who fails to protect an invitee from foreseeable criminal
assaults and the criminal assailant, the "lion's -share" of fault will be
apportioned to the criminal.96 If the criminal is unknown, as in Couch,
or known and insolvent, the innocent plaintiff is not likely to receive
compensation for the lion's share of her injuries.9 7
Another concern is the impact of reduced liability exposure on
incentives to take reasonable precautions. Reducing a defendant's
liability exposure in general necessarily reduces the liability incentive
to take reasonable precautions. This concern is amplified in the
premises liability/negligent security context as fault can now be
apportioned to known and unknown criminals. If the lion's share of
fault will be apportioned to the criminal assailant, as other courts have
predicted, the premises owner's liability incentive will be correspondingly
reduced.98
The majority in Couch dismissed this concern with the observation
that "a property owner must still keep his premises safe or face potential
liability for an amount of damages commensurate with its responsibility
95. Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 359, 729 S.E.2d 378, 379 (2012).
96. Veazey v. Ehnwood Plantation Assoc. Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 719 (La. 1994) ("[A]ny
rational juror will apportion the lion's share of the fault to the intentional tortfeasor when
instructed to compare the fault of a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor.);
see also Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tenn. 1997) ("[Juries will likely allocate
most if not all fault to the intentional actor....").
97. E.g., Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 729 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
98. The prospect of tort liability may not be the only incentive a property owner has
to make the premises safe. Market forces and government regulations may encourage
landlords, hotels, and others to take reasonable precautions to protect their invitees from
the risk of foreseeable crimes. But whatever incentive is created by potential tort liability
is necessarily reduced when tort liability is reduced.
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for a plaintiff's harm."99 Such a cavalier comment is either naively
simplistic or perhaps disingenuous. The court fails to even acknowledge
that a premises owner's liability exposure has been reduced, and
probably by a significant margin. While one might debate just how
much potential tort liability shapes premises owners' conduct, it is
beyond debate that the extent of that incentive has been reduced.
Similar criticism can be leveled at the court's treatment of the impact of
its ruling on the property owner's duty to keep the premises reasonably
safe.100 The court comments that allowing apportionment of fault to
the criminal assailant does not nullify the property owner's duty because
"[t]he duty remains even where damages are apportioned."'0 ' While
it is true that the property owner's duty has not been "nullified," the
court fails to acknowledge that it likely has been severely undermined.
The criticism here is more than one over word choices. The court's
systematic discounting of the practical consequences of its ruling masks
the deficiencies with its "ordinary language" statutory construction
analysis. The relevant question on statutory construction is legislative
intent. Thus, the relevant questions are whether by using the undefined
term "fault" the legislature intended to overturn more than a hundred
years of common law precedent and allow a de facto comparative fault
defense to intentional torts and to diminish, probably significantly, the
incentives for premises owners to meet their nondelegable duty to use
reasonable care to protect invitees from the foreseeable risk of criminal
assaults. Cast in this light, resorting to a dictionary seems an inade-
quate, or at least incomplete, guide to legislative intent.
A more intellectually honest response would be to acknowledge that
the 2005 amendments to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 as construed in McRey-
nolds and Couch are likely to dilute the financial incentives for premises
owners to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from the
foreseeable risk of criminal assaults, but this result was a policy choice
made by the legislature in enacting the legislation. Similarly, the
legislature chose to shift the risk of the uncollectible share from
tortfeasors to innocent plaintiffs. In other words, the legislature
determined that a defendant's interest in limiting its liability to its
percentage of fault should take precedence over the potential dilution of
incentives or the innocent plaintiff's interest in securing full compensa-
tion. It is not appropriate for the court to substitute its judgment
99. Couch, 291 Ga. at 366, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
100. This duty is imposed by statute, and has been characterized as "nondelegable."
O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2000); Mason v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 106, 112,633 S.E.2d
426, 431 (2006); Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 702, 458 S.E.2d 883, 884 (1995).
101. Couch, 291 Ga. at 366, 729 S.E.2d at 383.
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regarding policy for that of the legislature so long as the statute is
constitutional.
What can the plaintiff do in response to McReynolds and Couch? One
point that has already been discussed is to challenge the defendant to
prove that the other parties or non-parties to whom the defendant seeks
to have fault apportioned are, in fact, at least partially liable to the
plaintiff. This tactic places the plaintiff in the unaccustomed position of
arguing that someone was not at fault, not a cause in fact, or not the
proximate cause of the injuries for which she seeks compensation. This
strategy, successfully employed in McReynolds..2 and Fields,10 3 may
prove to be problematic in the premises liability/negligent security
context. In order to establish that the premises owner's negligence was
the cause in fact and proximate cause of a criminal assault, the plaintiff
must prove there was a criminal assault. Thus, the very evidence
needed to establish the premise owner's liability will tend to provide the
basis for apportioning fault to the criminal assailant.
A second and equally challenging strategy will be to find ways to
convince the trier of fact to apportion more fault to the target defendants
and less fault to those parties and non-parties from whom the plaintiff
cannot realistically expect to recover. Thus, the plaintiff-passenger in
Barnett would attempt to convince the jury that her husband-driver (who
is protected by spousal immunity) was either not at fault or his fault
was minor in comparison with that of the driver of the other vehicle.'
102. In McReynolds, the defendant's failure to offer evidence that GM manufactured
a defective automobile precluded set off and apportionment. See text accompanying supra
note 92.
103. In Fields, the defendants' failure to offer evidence that the plaintiff was exposed
to products containing asbestos manufactured by fifty-one non-parties precluded apportion-
ment of fault to those non-parties. See text accompanying supra note 54.
104. Apportioning fault to parties with immunities will change the dynamics of other
litigations. For example, employees who are injured on the job and bring tort actions
against third parties will now have their recovery against third parties reduced by any
percentage of fault assigned to the plaintiffs' employers. Employers will have little
incentive to defend their conduct as their liability is limited by workers' compensation.
Thus, it will now fall upon the employee to challenge the third party's assertion that the
employer was negligent and that the employer's negligence was a cause in fact and
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. For a general discussion of the complexity of
balancing the interests of employers, employees, and third parties when an injured worker
has both a workers' compensation claim and a tort claim against a third party, see 7
ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw § 121 (2012).
My analysis appears in Thomas A. Eaton, Revisiting the Intersection of Workers'
Compensation and Product Liability: An Assessment of a Proposed Federal Solution to an
Old Problem, 64 TENN. L. REV. 881 (1997).
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In the premises liability/negligent security context, the formidable
challenge will be to convice a jury to qpportion more fault to the
premises owner and less to the criminal assailant. While this challenge
is formidable, it is not always insurmountable. In Hutcherson v. City of
Phoenix, 5 a jury apportioned seventy-five percent of fault to the city
that negligently handled a 911 call and twenty-five percent of fault to
the person who murdered the two plaintiffs. °6 In affirming the trial
court's denial of the city's motion for a new trial, the Arizona Supreme
Court emphasized three points: first, the city had a duty to use
reasonable care to prevent the very type of harm that occurred; second,
the city had actual knowledge of the danger and time within which to
act; and third, the conduct of the 911 operator could be viewed as
"shockingly inadequate, given the information [she] had obtained"
regarding the threats."7
B. Unanswered Questions
Couch and several lower court opinions addressed who may and may
not be apportioned fault. The court in Couch establishes that fault may
be apportioned to unknown intentional (indeed criminal) tortfeasors. 10 8
Lower court opinions indicate that fault may be apportioned to those
protected by immunity, but not to those who owe no duty to the plaintiff,
and not to persons whose liability is derivative of the fault of others.
Justice Benham's dissenting opinion in Couch raises several other
interesting possibilities.'0 9 Can fault be apportioned to someone whose
liability is predicated upon principles of "strict liability?" It is commonly
understood that strict liability is liability without fault."' If this
understanding were to prevail, it would seem that a trier of fact would
not be authorized to apportion fault between a tortfeasor whose liability
is based on negligence and another who is strictly liable. Georgia courts
have often referred to products liability as a form of strict liability."'
105. 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998).
106. Id. at 451.
107. Id. at 453-54.
108. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
109. Id. at 371, 729 S.E.2d at 387 (Benham, J., dissenting) ("How far along the
spectrum of culpability does 'fault' run? Did the General Assembly intend for it to cover
strict liability? Breach of warranty? Product liability?").
110. One leading legal dictionary defines "strict liability" as "[1liability that does not
depend on actual negligence or intent to harm .... Also termed ... liability without
fault." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
111. E.g., Jones v. Nordictrack, Inc., 274 Ga. 115, 118 n.5, 550 S.E.2d 101, 103 n.5
(2001) (indicating that a risk/utility test analysis applies under both negligence and strict
liability theories); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 735 n.3, 450 S.E.2d 671, 674
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Does this mean that there can be no apportionment between a negligent
retailer and the manufacturer of a defective product? 112 Georgia courts
have also allowed personal injury recovery under the theory of breach of
warranty."' Historically, actions for breach of warranty were ground-
ed in principles of contract and conduct-based defenses, such as
comparative fault, which traditionally have not applied to breaches of
contract. In light of these principles, can fault be apportioned to the
seller of a product when there is a breach of express or implied
warranty?"'
The absence of a statutory definition of fault renders these questions
unnecessarily difficult. Courts will be called upon to answer them
without any clear legislative guidance, and it is folly to believe they can
be resolved by simply repeating the mantra of "ordinary language."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary offers little insight into legislative
intent when the underlying legal principles are so deeply entwined in a
rich and complex history. There is no extrinsic evidence that the
General Assembly that enacted the 2005 amendments to O.C.G.A. § 51-
12-33 gave any consideration to the specific questions of interpretation
that courts will be called upon to answer.
n.3 (1994) (noting that the risk/utility test used to determine whether a product has a
defective design may "overlap" with negligence, but insisting that a risk utility test does
not obliterate the "long recognized [distinction] between negligence and strict liability").
The Georgia Court of Appeals recently held that a Georgia court should not apply Indiana
products liability law because it does not allow a strict liability claim for defective design.
Bailey v. Cottrell, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 371, 374-75, 721 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2011). Judge, now
Justice, Blackwell concurred specially. He agreed that Georgia law should govern the case,
but disagreed that there was any meaningful difference between Indiana's negligence and
Georgia's risk/utility standards. Id. at 376, 721 S.E.2d at 575.
112. Cf Deere & Co. v. Brooks, 250 Ga. 517, 299 S.E.2d 704 (1983) (implying that
careless conduct of the plaintiff falling short of assumption of risk is not a defense to a
products liability claim); Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 237 Ga. App. 316, 514 S.E.2d 227 (1999)
(finding no error in charging a jury that contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim
of strict liability, but that comparative negligence could apply to a claim for negligent
design).
113. E.g., Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558 (1996) (breach of
implied warranty of merchantability); Moore v. Berry, 217 Ga. App. 697, 458 S.E.2d 879
(1995) (breach of express warranty); see also Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448
(5th Cir. 2002) (breach of express warranty).
114. A leading treatise on Georgia products liability law states that the plaintiffs
negligence is not a defense to warranty-based claims. NEAL, supra note 93, § 11:3, at 219
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486,487,224 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1976)judgment
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 237 Ga. 554, 229 S.E.2d 379 (1976)); see also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jackson Transp. Co., 126 Ga. App. 471, 474, 191 S.E.2d
110, 112-13 (1972) (noting contributory negligence is not a per se defense to a claim based
on breach of warranty).
36 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
Another set of unanswered questions concerns the reconciliation of
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 with the two statutes that precede it. First,
consider O.C.G.A. § 51-12-31.1" This statute provides: "In its verdict,
the jury may specify the particular damages to be recovered of each
defendant. Judgment in such a case must be entered severally."
116
The permissive "may" used in § 51-12-31 contrasts sharply with the
mandatory "shall" that appears in § 51-12-33(b). When is a jury
permitted to apportion fault (or not), and when is it required to do so?
The court in Couch found no conflict between these two statutes because
§ 51-12-31 expressly provides that "[e]xcept as provided in Code Section
51-12-33. "117 But this begs the question: In what cases will § 51-12-31
have any application? By amending but not repealing § 51-12-31, the
legislature must have envisioned there would be some circumstance in
which that statute would apply. But precisely when remains a
mystery. 118
A similar issue arises regarding O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32, which authorizes
contribution among joint tortfeasors. I19 Under § 51-12-33(b), however,
115. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-31 (2000 & Supp. 2012).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
Except as provided in Code Section 51-12-33, where an action is brought jointly
against several persons, the plaintiff may recover damages for an injury caused
by any of the defendants against only the defendant or defendants liable for the
injury. In its verdict, the jury may specify the particular damages to be recovered
of each defendant. Judgment in such a case must be entered severally.
Id.
117. Couch, 291 Ga. at 373 n.15, 729 S.E.2d at 389 n.15 (emphasis added); see also
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-31.
118. This issue has been argued in a case pending before the Georgia Supreme Court.
Appellee's First Supplemental Brief, GFI Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Medina, No. S12A1228, 2012
WL 3236340 (Ga. Apr. 6,2012). At the time of the preparation of this Article the court had
not issued an opinion in this case.
119. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32 (2000).
(a) Except as provided in Code Section 51-12-33, where a tortious act does not
involve moral turpitude, contribution among several trespassers may be enforced
just as if an action had been brought against them jointly. Without the necessity
of being charged by action or judgment, the right of a joint trespasser to
contribution from another or others shall continue unabated and shall not be lost
or prejudiced by compromise and settlement of a claim or claims for injury to
person or property or for wrongful death and release therefrom.
(b) If judgment is entered jointly against several trespassers and is paid off by
one of them, the others shall be liable to him for contribution.
(c) Without the necessity of being charged by an action or judgment, the right
of indemnity, express or implied, from another or others shall continue unabated
and shall not be lost or prejudiced by compromise and settlement of a claim or
claims for injury to person or property or for wrongful death and release
therefrom.
JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY
"liability of each person against whom [damages] are awarded 0 shall
not be a joint liability among the persons liable, and shall not be subject
to any right of contribution."120  How does one harmonize a statute
that authorizes contribution with one that eliminates joint liability?
McReynolds does not address this apparent conflict other than to say
§ 51-12-32 "obviously cannot trump the rules set forth in [O.C.G.A.] § 51-
12-33 because it begins with the phrase, '[elxcept as provided in Code
Section 51-12-33. '""2  Again, this observation begs the question: In
light of § 51-12-33, when, if ever, does a right of contribution exist under
§ 51-12-32?
Finally, can an innocent plaintiff avoid the apportionment problems
discussed in the paper entirely by simply bringing suit against only one
defendant? Apportionment under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) is required
"[wihen an action is brought against more than one person for injury to
person or property .... If we take an "ordinary language" ap-
proach to statutory construction, this provision would appear to have no
application to cases when the action is brought against only one person.
V. CONCLUSION
Without question, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 as construed in McReynolds and
Couch ushers in a new era in Georgia tort law. It topples the old regime
in which multiple tortfeasors were held jointly liable when their
combined acts of negligence injured an innocent plaintiff. The new
regime is one of apportionment and liability limited to one's personal
share of fault. Fault may be apportioned when it previously could not.
It may be apportioned to those who are immune, to those who are
unknown, and even to those who intentionally injure an innocent
plaintiff. The practical consequence of this regime change is to place the
risk of the uncollectible share upon the innocent plaintiff. Fewer
innocent plaintiffs will be fully compensated for their injuries, and
liability incentives for defendants will be reduced. While important
questions remain to be resolved, the big picture has emerged: apportion-
ment, not joint liability, is the new norm.
Id.
120. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (2000 & Supp. 2012).
121. McReynolds 1, 290 Ga. at 852-53, 725 S.E.2d at 588; see also O.C.GA.A § 51-12-
32(a).
122. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
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